We introduce the axiom of composition independence for power indices and value maps. In the context of compound (two-tier) voting, the axiom requires the power attributed to a voter to be independent of the second-tier voting games played in all constituencies other than that of the voter. We show that 
Introduction
The Banzhaf power index is arguably the most adequate mechanism for measuring the a priori in ‡uence of voters in a voting situation; see, e.g., the extensive discussion in Section 3.1 of Felsenthal and Machover (1998). The idea behind the index is clear and simple. If a voter, or an outside observer, stand behind the standard "veil of ignorance", the best they can do is to assume that Yes and No votes by the electorate members constitute outcomes of Bernoulli trials with p = 1 2 (i.e., each voter is a priori equally likely to choose Yes or No). In this setting, it is natural to de…ne the power of a voter to in ‡uence the voting outcome as the probability that his vote is decisive, namely, that the election would be lost without that voter's support but won with his support.
The Banzhaf power index has a long history. A version of it was initially suggested by Penrose (1946) , followed by two subsequent rediscoveries by Banzhaf (1965 Banzhaf ( , 1966 Banzhaf ( , 1968 ) and Coleman (1971) . 1 The much-used probabilistic version described above 2 has its origin in the work of Dubey and Shapley (1979) , who initiated the study of the Banzhaf index in the game-theoretic framework. Following the approach of Shapley and Shubik (1954), they model a voting situation as a simple cooperative game (or voting game); the Banzhaf index of a player (voter) is then the probability that he is a swinger for a random coalition of other players (which each player joins with probability 1 2 , independently of anyone else), meaning that he turns that coalition from losing to winning by joining it. 3 The simple probabilistic model upon which the Banzhaf index is based has a fascinating implication for measuring voting power in compound voting. The latter 1 The name of John F. Banzhaf III has been the one most associated with that power index, due to the number of works he authored on the subject and the legal repercussions of his …ndings and recommendations. Thus, siding with most of the literature, we will use the term "Banzhaf power index" for brevity, although, and perhaps more appropriately, the index is sometimes referred to as the Penrose-Banzhaf-Coleman power index. 2 Felsenthal and Machover (1998) call this version "the Banzhaf measure." 3 Our notion of swinger is a slight adaptation of the term used in Dubey and Shapley (1979, p. 103), who de…ned it in relation to a random coalition that may include the swinger, in which case the e¤ect of his departure from that coalition on its winning status is also considered. The probability of being a swinger is the same under both de…nitions, and hence both swinger notions may be used in de…ning the Banzhaf index.
term refers to two-tier voting systems, of which there are numerous examples ranging from high-pro…le ones such as the US Electoral College and the Council of the European Union to the legislative organization of a local government. The common game-theoretic model underlying these systems is the one in which the player set N is partitioned into k disjoint "constituencies" C 1 ; :::; C k , and the outcome of the vote in a constituency C j is described by a simple game w j with player set C j (w j is, in most cases, the simple majority game). Following the vote in N = [ k j=1 C j ; decision-making moves into the "council of representatives," where players-representatives from the set R = f1; :::; kg vote in accordance with the voting outcomes in their respective constituencies; the outcome of the council vote is in turn determined by a simple game v (which is, in most cases, a weighted majority game 4 ).
In the compound game v [w 1 ; :::; w k ] thus described, player i 0 2 C j 0 is a swinger with respect to a coalition S N n fi 0 g if and only if he is a swinger in the game w j 0 (for S \ C j 0 ) and his representative j 0 is a swinger in v (for the coalition T of representatives j 6 = j 0 whose vote is sanctioned by S, i.e., w j (S \ C j ) = 1): A little re ‡ection reveals that when players in N n fi 0 g form S by joining randomly and independently (each with probability 1 2 ), the event that i is a swinger in w j 0 and the event that j 0 is a swinger in v are themselves independent; moreover, the induced distribution of T R is such that each representative participates in it with probability 1 2 ; 5 independently of other representatives: The de…nition of the Banzhaf index of a player as his probability of being a swinger -for a coalition joined by each other player with probability 1 2 and independently of the rest -thus implies a well-known property of the index: the power of player i 0 in the compound game v [w 1 ; :::; w k ] is equal to the product of his power in his second-tier game w j 0 and the power of his representative j 0 in the …rst-tier game v.
The latter attribute of the Banzhaf index, to which we will refer as the composition 4 The weights given to di¤erent representatives may be (roughly) proportional to the population sizes of the counties they represent; but that is often not the case, either by necessity or by design.
(See Chapter 4 of Felsenthal and Machover (1998)) for many examples of weighted voting in the US.) 5 To be precise, in order for the this property to hold all second-tier games w j need to be decisive, i.e., constant-sum (as in the scenario where all w j are simple majority games with an odd number of players).
property, was …rst noticed by Owen (1975 The appeal of the composition property leads to the natural question of whether there are other sensible power indices sharing this property. It turns out that the composition property is too powerful to allow any signi…cant freedom of choice. Owen (1978) showed that, on the space of all games, 7 the Banzhaf value is essentially the only value map that satis…es standard axioms in conjunction with the composition property. 8 The strength of the composition property is particularly noticeable when attention is restricted to simple games: Dubey et al. (2005) showed that imposing just two axioms together with the composition property yields the Banzhaf power index.
(The two axioms are transfer (or valuation), which has been the standard substitute for the additivity axiom in the context of simple games since its introduction in Dubey (1975) , and strict positivity (or monotonicity), which requires the power measure to be non-negative and non-zero.) 6 The underlying assumption behind this principle is that all second-tier voting games are simple majority games, which is the case in most real-life instances of compound voting. 7 The claim is also true for the space of all constant-sum games. 8 See Theorems 7 and 8 in Owen (1978) . Although some other indices, such as the useless null index and the simplistic "dictatorial" index, also emerge from his axiomatization, they are easily removed by adding the dummy and strict positivity axioms; see Section 5 in Owen (1978) .
The composition property may, as an axiom, be criticized on the grounds of being a technical or computational requirement, lacking a compelling conceptual basis. As a very strong condition, however, the composition property can be weakened in various ways, which may provide a conceptually sounder axiom. That is the path we intend to follow, starting with the following observation. According to the composition property, the ingredients for computing the power of player i We will show that both the Banzhaf power index and the Banzhaf value can be uniquely characterized using the composition independence axiom. As composition independence is relatively mild on its own, the result of the type of Dubey et al. (2005) -where the composition property was accompanied by just two extra requirementsshould not be expected. And, indeed, in our results a total of …ve (logically indepen- 9 As in the premise for the composition property, it will be assumed that the second-tier games but its weaker form -additivity -will su¢ ce for our needs. (Additivity is the most frequently used axiom in the treatment of value maps ever since its introduction in Shapley (1953) .)
The extra non-semivalue axiom that we impose is new, and contains a requirement that is signi…cantly weaker than e¢ ciency. The e¢ ciency axiom, whereby the total power of all players is equal to 1 (or the total value is equal to the worth of the grand coalition, in the case of general games) is almost invariably assumed in axiomatizations of the Shapley-Shubik power index and the Shapley value, but it is ‡agrantly violated by the Banzhaf index. However, we will show that the Banzhaf index has the following ‡avor of e¢ ciency: Consider a sequence of simple games where the size of the player set tends to in…nity; then it cannot be the case that, in the limit, every player's power is above some positive constant that is common to all players. 10 This will be postulated for general power indices by our vanishing power axiom. Stated slightly more generally, the same axiom will be assumed on value maps in the context of general games.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall the basic de…nitions pertaining to …nite and simple games, and the notions of the Banzhaf index and value. Section 3 states our axioms for power indices on the domain of simple games and Section 4 proves the characterization result for the Banzhaf index. Section 5 does 10 We will establish this claim in Remark 2. Any e¢ cient power index would satisfy such a claim, but it is not entirely obvious in the case of the non-e¢ cient Banzhaf index.
likewise for the Banzhaf value on the space of all …nite games.
Preliminaries 2.1 Finite games and simple games
Let U be an in…nite universe of players; it may be assumed w.l.o.g. that U includes the set N of positive integers. Denote the collection of all coalitions (subsets of U ) by 2 U ; and the empty coalition by ;: A game on U is given by a map v :
We say that v is a …nite game if it has a …nite carrier; the minimal carrier of such v is, in e¤ect, its true player set. The space of all …nite games on U is denoted by G: A game v 2 G is said to be constant-sum, or of constant sum c, if
The domain SG G of simple games on U consists of all v 2 G such that: (i) The Banzhaf value is a value map that is given, for any v 2 G with a …nite 11 We shall henceforth omit braces when indicating one-element sets.
carrier N; by
if i 2 N; where n = jN j ; and (v) (i) = 0 if i 2 U n N: It is easy to see that (v) is well de…ned, being independent of the choice of the carrier N of v. The restriction of to SG is the Banzhaf (power) index.
Axioms for Power Indices
This section introduces our axioms -plausible requirements that a general power index ' may be expected to obey -whose combination will later be shown to uniquely characterize the Banzhaf power index. We begin with four familiar semivalue axioms that are quite routinely assumed in dealing with power indices, either in their entirety or in part. The positivity requirement is natural, as every v 2 SG is monotonic by assumption and hence the in ‡uence of any player joining a coalition is always non-negative.
Axiom IV: Dummy (Dum). If v 2 SG and i is a dummy player in v, i.e.
v(S
A dummy player in a simple game can be either a dictator ( 
if i 2 N; where
and ' (v) (i) = 0 when i 2 U n N: When is concentrated on SG be a sequence of games with corresponding (nonempty) carriers fN k g 1 k=1 ; and assume that lim k!1 jN k j = 1: Then
The axiom embodies a mild aspect of e¢ ciency (that would require the total power of all players to be equal to 1), by stipulating that, when the size of the player set of a game tends to in…nity, it cannot be the case that every player's power is above some positive constant that is common to all players. 
where [m] denotes the integer part of m. This implies that
By the standard application of the Stirling's formula (see, e.g., Spencer and Florescu (2014)),
Uniqueness of the Banzhaf Index
The six axioms of the previous section uniquely characterize the Banzhaf power index: Theorem 1. The Banzhaf index is the only power index on SG that satis…es Tran, Sym, Pos, Dum, CompInd, and VanPow.
Proof. The fact that satis…es the axioms has been established in the previous section. Now assume that ' is a power index on SG that satis…es the six axioms.
In particular, ' is a semivalue (see Remark 1), and hence there exists a probability measure on [0; 1] for which (1), (2) (1) and (2) in Remark 1,
On the other hand,
It follows from CompInd, applied to the compound games v = m 1;2;3 [u 1 ; u 2 ; m 3;4;5 ]
and m 1;2;3 = m 1;2;3 [u 1 ; u 2 ; u 3 ] ; that the expressions in (5) and (6) are equal. Thus
where
Now notice that p(0) = p( ; 1g (indeed, p has a unique local maximum of 0; attained at x max = 1 2
;
and a global minimum of 1 16 ; attained at x min;1 = ) and at x min;2 = 1 2
; 1)). Thus (7) implies that is supported on f0;
; 1g:
Finally, for each k 1 consider the games v k = u 1 _ ::: _ u k and v k = u 1^: ::^u k with carrier N k = f1; :::; kg: By applying (1) and (2), and using the fact that is supported on f0; ; which means that ' = : 4. The null index, ' 0; satis…es all the axioms except Dum.
The Shapley-Shubik power index, given by
for every v 2 SG with a …nite carrier N and i 2 N; and ' (v) (i) = 0 for every i 2 U n N; satis…es all the axioms except CompInd.
6. Let ' (v) (i) = v(i) for every v 2 SG and i 2 U . The power index ' satis…es all the axioms except VanPow. As VanPow only has "bite" because the universe of players U is in…nite, this example also shows that our axioms would not uniquely characterize for a …nite U .
Axioms for Value Maps and the Banzhaf Value
In this section we will extend and modify our axioms in order to …t the setting of value maps. Of the four semivalue axioms, Tran changes the most, returning to its original form of the additivity axiom that has been immensely popular in cooperative game theory since its introduction in Shapley (1953) . (Tran, …rst suggested and used in Dubey (1975) , was a necessary adaptation of additivity in the context of simple games, as their set is not closed under addition.)
The other three semivalue axioms undergo only two small changes: the domain of games switches from SG to G, and the games in the premise of Pos'are assumed to be monotonic (that was not necessary for the domain SG of Pos because simple games that we consider are monotonic by de…nition).
Axiom II' : Symmetry (Sym' ). For any v 2 G, i 2 U; and 2 ; ' ( v) (i) =
Axiom III' : Positivity (Pos' ). For any monotonic v 2 G and i 2 U , ' (v) (i)
0:
Axiom IV' : Dummy (Dum' ). If v 2 G and i is a dummy player in v, i.e.
Although the proof of our forthcoming characterization result for the Banzhaf value does not require any change in CompInd, i.e., it would have su¢ ced to limit attention to simple …rst-and second-tier games in compounding, we will introduce a version of the axiom for general compound games in order to stress that the property in CompInd is not speci…c to simple games, as far as the Banzhaf value is concerned. 
for all S 2 2 U . Each game w j can be thought of as determining the probability that a coalition S "controls" the representative j of the constituency C j in the …rst-tier game v; u(S) is then the expected payo¤ to S in that probabilistic scenario. G be a sequence of monotonic games with corresponding (nonempty) carriers fN k g 1 k=1 ; and assume that
Remark 4 (The Banzhaf value satis…es VanPow' ). Let A > 0 be such
A for all k 1: For each 0 < q A and k 1; denote by v 
for all S 2 2 U : From the de…nition of and (8) it follows that, for every k 1 and
and hence
15 Notice that v q k may be the zero game, which is, in principle, excluded from the domain SG: For technical reasons, we will admit the game v = 0 as part of SG in our forthcoming considerations, keeping in mind that (0) = 0:
where the last inequality is immediate from (4). Arguing as in Remark 2 from this point on, we obtain the equality
The six modi…ed axioms uniquely characterize the Banzhaf value, just as their original versions did in the case of the Banzhaf power index: Theorem 2. The Banzhaf value is the only value map on G that satis…es Add, Sym' , Pos' , Dum' , CompInd' , and VanPow' .
Proof. It has already been established that satis…es the above axioms, and it only remains to be shown that any value map ' satisfying the axioms must coincide with : Given any such '; its restriction ' j SG to the domain SG clearly satis…es the axioms Tran, 16 Sym, Pos, Dum, CompInd, and VanPow for power indices, and
by Theorem 1.
Next …x a …nite set ; 6 = N U; and, for any ; 6 = T N , denote by u T 2 SG the unanimity game with carrier T; given by u T (S) = 
Add also implies that ' (au T ) = a' (u T ) for any rational a; and an application of Pos'(enabled by the fact that au T is monotonic for any positive a) establishes the equality ' (au T ) = a' (u T ) for any real a. Using this and (9), the equality (10) yields ' (v) = X 
